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Abstract
Identity management provides PET (privacy enhancing technology) tools for users to control privacy of
their personal data. With the support of mobile location determination techniques based on GPS, WLAN,
Bluetooth, etc., context-aware and location-aware mobile applications (e.g. restaurant ﬁnder, friend ﬁnder,
indoor and outdoor navigation, etc.) have gained quite big interest in the business and IT world. Considering
sensitive static personal information (e.g. name, address, phone number, etc.) and also dynamic personal
information (e.g. current location, velocity in car, current status, etc.), mobile identity management is
required to help mobile users to safeguard their personal data. In this paper, we evaluate certain required
aspects and features (e.g. context-to-context dependence and relation, blurring in levels, trust management
with p3p integration, extended privacy preferences, etc.) of mobile identity management systems from the
perspective of a push context-aware application, i.e. the Friend Finder application.
Keywords: privacy, mobile identity management, location-based applications, p3p
1 Introduction
Social, ethical and legal aspects require privacy of users in the digital Internet
platform. With the introduction of new web technologies, users give away many of
their personal data to other service providers and Internet users. But the risk of
misusing the collected personal data threatens privacy of users. Service providers
can proﬁle users, send spam emails based on their proﬁling results, apply dynamic
pricing which means diﬀerent people pay diﬀerent amount for the same service,
forward and even sell data collected to third parties.
On the other hand, the legacy laws based on EU directives [3,4] regulate that
personal data of an individual should not be retrieved without his consent, not be
used for other purposes rather than the stated purpose, not be shared with oth-
ers if it is not stated before and be deleted if the user cancels his or her consent
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later. Technical system developers should take into consideration of privacy regu-
lations and integrate privacy-enhancing tools within their systems in order to help
individuals to guarantee their privacy.
Identity is described as “one or more attributes which are applicable to this
particular subject or object” 3 . A user can hold many identities and each identity
can be assigned to many of his attributes. Identity management helps individuals
to control their personal data when they need to be shared with other third parties
and thus supports their privacy.
With the new trend towards high-level mobile devices like Personal Digital As-
sistants (PDAs) and mobile phones, context-aware mobile applications have started
becoming a part of our daily lives. More context-aware applications will be experi-
enced in the near future. Finding nearby pizza shops and restaurants, friend ﬁnder
applications [7,2], tracking kids [17], locating people in emergency [10], location-
based chats and games [11] are the typical examples of the context-aware applica-
tions that exist today. Mobile users of context-aware applications have also iden-
tities that are in interaction with other principals. Besides, the location attribute
of mobile users is a very sensitive context attribute and must be protected against
unauthorized access. Considering this, mobile identity management has become an
important requirement for context-aware applications.
Mobile identity management can be considered as a subgroup of identity man-
agement. This statement is partially true. The new context data especially location
data has its own characteristics and therefore not all identity management solutions
can be applied to mobile identity management. In this paper, we focus on a speciﬁc
push context-aware application (i.e. the Friend Finder) and evaluate the important
privacy aspects from the perspective of mobile identity management. The aspects
we mention are not only speciﬁc to mobile identity management, but their evalua-
tion is more mobile-centric.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces context-aware applica-
tions and motivates on the Friend Finder application. Section 3 explains the existing
privacy risks and the requirement for a mobile identity management. Section 4 ex-
plains the related works. Section 5 discusses the required aspects related to mobile
identity management. Section 6 gives the details of the integration of the required
aspects within the Friend Finder application. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2 Friend Finder Application
Context-aware applications facilitate the context data (e.g. location, time, velocity,
etc.) of mobile users for enabling services. Service providers and telecommunication
providers already focus on extending their infrastructures and developing applica-
tions in order to support mobile users getting beneﬁt of context-aware especially
location-aware applications. In context-aware applications, mobile user’s context
data such as current location, time, weather, proﬁle, etc. are considered by service
3 from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity management
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Fig. 1. Friend Finder Service
providers while the mobile users holding their PDAs are interested in getting the
service that best ﬁts their current context.
Context-aware applications can be grouped as pull and push services based on
how service is retrieved. In pull services, mobile users ask for a particular service, get
the requested service and ﬁnish the interaction with the service provider. Restaurant
ﬁnder is a typical example for pull services. In push services, mobile users are
interested in a particular service and register to the service provider in order to
retrieve the service which is triggered if a certain event occurs or a certain time
period passes.
Friend Finder is a typical example of push service for location-based applica-
tions, i.e. locating relatives and friends within certain area [7]. There are mainly
two types of principals in the Friend Finder. These are mobile users and the location
provider as illustrated in Figure 1. Additionally, other providers like map provider
can also take part in the Friend Finder (see Figure 5).
The business logic of the Friend Finder works as follows: The mobile users par-
ticipating in the Friend Finder application send periodically their location data com-
puted by their mobile devices to the central location provider. They can then query
locations of their particular friends and relatives through the location provider.
Normally, the location provider presents the location information as simple text
to mobile users. The map provider can enhance this functionality by showing the
location information of mobile users on a visual map with navigation instructions.
3 Mobile Identity Management
Mobile users have security considerations and are anxious about the privacy of
their context, especially their location [18]. In many cases, they require guaranteed
context privacy, otherwise, they would refuse to use the service. Some particular
questions regarding context privacy are:
• What happens if service providers collect my location information regularly and
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use this collected information to track me or to make user proﬁles?
• What if service providers record at what times during the day I frequently use
the services and send me advertisements at these times?
• What happens if the service providers share my location information with other
third parties?
• Do service providers really need my location for this particular service?
• Is it enough if I give away my location information with a low resolution?
Mobile identity management helps users interacting with mobile applications to
safeguard their personal data in the digital world as they do in the physical life.
You have many relations with other people and organizations in the society. You
are a computer scientist, a husband, a child, a friend or a stranger for somebody
at the same time. That means, you have many partial identities [24]. Each partial
identity is mapped to a group of attributes. You can intuitively decide which partial
identity is used for communicating with whom. You also switch from one partial
identity to another very easily and quickly. You can control to whom you trust
and do not trust. This scenario needs to be also possible in the digital world. You
should be able to create diﬀerent partial identities, map a group of attributes to
this identity and decide which partial identity to use based on your partner.
Mobile identity management should be beyond the formulation of “which at-
tributes belong to which identity and which identity is used with whom”. If you
consider the social life, you do not give any information about you to someone
which might tell this information to other people. You build automatically your
trust relations with others. You do not talk about your secrets with your friends
if others are around and this is something like secure communication. Considering
location attribute, you do not tell your exact location everybody every time. You
tell your exact location in weekdays to your boss but at the weekend your boss does
not need to know your location. On the other hand, your wife can get to know
your location at anytime and wherever you are. You generally remember which
information was given to which person (i.e. history management). If required, you
prefer staying anonymous while you are in interaction. When you buy something
from supermarket, you do not need to identity yourself. All these aspects are part
of identity management and must be supported by mobile identity management
solutions in the digital world as well.
4 Related Work
The PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe) project [14] is sup-
ported by the European Union’s Sixth Framework Program and the Swiss Federal
Oﬃce for Education and Science. The aim of the PRIME is the development of
privacy-enhancing tools for identity management.
idemix [8] has been developed within the PRIME project and aims achieving
anonymous authentication in applications. The LBS [12] prototype of the PRIME
implements a demo of location-based applications for pharmacy search. The demo
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application shows how privacy of personal data and pseudonymity are protected
against mobile operators and service providers. Unlike our focus on push services,
the demo application considers only pull services. Besides, certain aspects like
context relations and dependencies, blurring in levels are not within the concern of
the PRIME LBS.
The FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society) [5] project is a Net-
work of Excellence project and supported by the European Union under the 6th
Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. FIDIS fo-
cuses on the topics like future identity management, identity thefts, privacy with
legal-social content, mobility and identity, etc. They have surveyed a detailed
database of identity management solutions in academia and industry [6].
The NEXUS project at the University of Stuttgart-Germany focuses also on
context-aware applications and “envisions the World Wide Space to be the common
basis for future context- aware applications”. In their sub-project regarding security
and privacy, they propose [21] providing location privacy by applying coordinate
transformations. They show that how location can be rendered illegible and it is
still possible to perform processing operations required by location-based services.
Jendricke et al. present an identity manager to control personal data sent from
mobile devices through networks [22]. An identity manager provides an interface
with which one creates diﬀerent virtual identiﬁcations (IDs), i.e. pseudonyms, and
binds a subset of his personal data to each ID. When communicating with a service
provider, the user chooses an ID that is suitable for this particular type of commu-
nication. Before any personal data is sent to a service provider, the user is explicitly
asked to conﬁrm the transmission. On the other hand, the identity manager does
cover only limited aspects of mobile identity management for context-aware appli-
cations. As examples, blurring in levels, history management, trust management
and context relations are not explicitly supported.
P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences) [16] and Appel (A P3P Preference Ex-
change Language) [1] are W3C recommendations and help the individuals to build a
trust relation with servers and service providers. Servers and service providers spec-
ify their data collection policies as P3P policies and publish them. The users specify
their privacy preferences in Appel. The P3P-capable user agents (e.g. browsers)
retrieve the server’s P3P policy, compare with the user’s Appel preferences and in
case of any conﬂiction the communication is canceled.
For communication anonymity, Anonymizer [15] and mix-network based solu-
tions JAP [9] and Tor [19] exist. Anonymizer simply retrieves the user’s http re-
quest, forwards it to the server, receives the reply from the server and sends it back
to the user. Providing this, the server does not know anything about the user.
But, the Anonymizer knows about the user and therefore the users have to trust
the Anonymizer. In mix-network based solutions the messages are encryptedly ex-
changed between diﬀerent nodes staying between the sender and the receiver. Each
node knows about the sender and the next node. Therefore, the ﬁrst node knows
about the user but not the server and similarly the last node knows about the
server but not the user. Recently, a study on Tor network has been published [13].
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Tor designers assume that the traﬃc between the user and the server is already
encrypted. Otherwise, the exit node in the Tor mix-network can sniﬀ the message
networks. Based on this restriction, Swede Dan Egerstad was equipped with 5 Tor
exit nodes and could sniﬀ around 100 log-in credentials belonging to diﬀerent con-
sulates in diﬀerent countries. This example shows us that any security architecture
and tool should be designed in a very dynamic way. The tools for mobile identity
management should also be able to enforce diﬀerent security mechanisms only with
small conﬁguration changes.
5 The Aspects
Based on their experiences and analysis of existing systems, Lederer et al. [23] ex-
plain 5 pitfalls against the design of technical systems related to personal privacy.
The ﬁrst pitfall is obscuring potential information ﬂow. The technical systems
should let users know what kind of information are collected about them, its pur-
pose, duration and the receivers. The second pitfall is obscuring actual information
ﬂow. Users should exactly know what actions are executed and nothing should be
hidden. For example, if a cookie is set on users’ device, they should be informed.
The third pitfall is emphasizing conﬁguration over action. The systems should not
require so many conﬁgurations and expect users simply to live by them. The forth
pitfall is lacking coarse-grained control. Users should be in the position of canceling
any data transfer or blurring of personal data. The last pitfall is inhibiting estab-
lished practices. Designs of technical systems should employ eﬀectively the privacy
patterns (e.g. blurring, anonymization, data limitation, etc.).
Considering all these pitfalls, we explain in this section the required aspects for
identity management and evaluate them from the perspective of the Friend Finder,
i.e. a pull context-aware application. The aspects are not directly speciﬁc only
to mobile identity management. But their evaluation is speciﬁc to context-aware
mobile applications.
5.1 Context-to-Context Dependence
A user can have both static context data like name, surname, address or dynamic
context data like current location, local weather conditions, velocity in his car, etc.
There is a very tight dependence between diﬀerent context data in terms of privacy.
For example, name-surname pair is dependent on address data and vice versa. If
someone knows your name and surname, it is not so diﬃcult to ﬁnd out your address.
That means if you give away your name-surname, you also give away your address.
Similarly in location-aware applications, if you know one’s current location with the
velocity and direction, it is not diﬃcult to reveal his future location within a one
hour. Considering the Friend Finder application, it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd out the
identity of a particular person if you get to know his friends list. Mobile identity
management systems should allow users to specify their privacy preferences. You
can explicitly specify which of your personal data is released or not released.
The context2context dependence aspect should be integrated within mobile iden-
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tity management system of the Friend Finder application. In case there exist any
logical conﬂictions during data release, mobile users should be warned and asked
how to proceed by the mobile identity management system. Providing this, the
pitfalls “obscuring potential and actual information ﬂow” can be avoided.
5.2 Context-to-Context Relation
During the management of privacy preferences, your choices are aﬀected by the
relations between diﬀerent context data. As a simple example, there is a relation
between the location and time. You can specify a preference like “I do not want
to release my location at the weekends”. Similarly, location:(time,person) relation
can also exist.“I want my boss to get to know my location only at weekdays” is an
example for such a relation. location:own location relation can be explained with
the example “I do not want to reveal my location if I am in Stuttgart”. The relation
location:remote location can be given as “I do not want to reveal my location if the
other party is not in the same building as me”. Static data can also have this kind
of relation. interest:interest relation for location-based chat means that “I release
my interests only to people who hold the same interests”.
The context2context relation aspect should be also a part of the mobile identity
management system of the Friend Finder application. Its privacy preference lan-
guage should support specifying context2context relations in terms of privacy. This
aspect, as a privacy pattern, avoids the pitfall “inhibiting established practices”.
5.3 Blurring in Levels
Blurring of a personal data means that giving the personal data not in an exact
form but rather in ranges or in a more abstract form. Blurring can help to protect
privacy and identity. You can give out your exact salary. But this data can give
hints about your job status, life standard, etc. If possible, the salary can be given
in ranges which makes such conclusions more diﬃcult. Location blurring can also
be applied. Location tracking can be prevented by applying blurring. For certain
applications, it should be enough to give only the city name or zip code instead of
exact GPS coordinates. For indoor applications, location blurring can be also very
helpful. Giving exact room number you are in is not something you would prefer to
release easily. Instead, you can blur it and reveal only the building name if it does
not hurt the functionality of the application.
Blurring can be applied in levels. For example, for outdoor locations; GPS
coordinates, street name, zip code, city, country and continent can compose such
location levels. For indoor locations; room number, ﬂoor number and building name
can compose the levels. Blurring in levels can also be used to improve the quality of
service. Assume you hold your PDA and are in the city center of Stuttgart. You are
interested in ﬁnding restaurants around you. You can either give your exact GPS
coordinates or you can release your zip code or city name. If you release your GPS
coordinates, the service provider presents a visual map which directs you to diﬀerent
restaurants around. If you give only the zip code, than you get the restaurants as
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a simple text list with addresses.
Blurring can improve the privacy and also the quality of service. The pitfall
“lacking coarse-grained control” can be avoided by the integration of blurring in
levels aspect. Hence, the mobile identity management system of the Friend Finder
application should support blurring mechanisms for any context data possible.
5.4 Extensible Preference Language
The speciﬁcation language for privacy preferences is very important for mobile iden-
tity management. Appel [1] as privacy preference language has limitations for iden-
tity management [20]. It is not straightforward to extend Appel for the integration
of the aspects explained in this paper. The preference language for the Friend Finder
application should take into consideration diﬀerent static and dynamic context data,
their dependencies and relations and also blurring in levels.
Our proposal for such a preference language is illustrated in Figure 2. User
privacy preferences are encoded in xml format. The mobile identity management
system of the Friend Finder rejects any data release unless any exception has been
deﬁned by the mobile users for a particular role (i.e. group of persons) or a person.
The context data to be protected is deﬁned with the tag protected and its attribute
property. Each protected element contains one or more exception tags which consist
of the attributes role and id and if tags for the validation of the exceptions. The
exception can be deﬁned for a certain group with the attribute role or a certain
person with the attribute id. An exception is also evaluated as true, if only all if
conditions are validated as true. Each if tag contains a context attribute (i.e. the
context data for validation), a condition attribute (i.e. the comparison structure)
and a value attribute.
<protected property="location|name|interests|velocity">
<exception role="family|work|private|..." id="wife|boss|..">
<if context="location" condition="is|is-not" value=" " />
<if context="time" condition="is|is-not|before|after" value=" " />
<if context="interest" condition="similar|not-similar" value=" " />
</exception>
.....
</protected>
Fig. 2. The Structure of Exceptions for Privacy Preferences
As a concrete example, you want your boss to access your location information
only at week days from 9.00 to 18.00 and your wife to access it anytime unless you
are not outside Germany. The relevant preferences can be expressed as in Figure 3.
<protected property="location">
<exception role="family" id="wife">
<if context="location" condition="is-not" value="Germany" />
</exception>
<exception role="work" id="boss">
<if context="time" condition="is-not" value="weekend" />
<if context="time" condition="between" value="09.00-18.00" />
<if context="location" condition="is-not" value="Germany" />
</exception>
</protected>
Fig. 3. A Sample of Privacy Preferences for Location
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Similarly, if you want to reveal your interests only to persons whose interests
are similar as yours, the relevant privacy preferences can be deﬁned as in Figure 4.
<protected property="interest">
<exception role="*">
<if context="partner_interest" condition="similar" value=$own_interest />
</exception>
</protected>
Fig. 4. A Sample of Privacy Preferences for Interests
5.5 Trust Management with P3P
After releasing your personal data to a service provider, you can not control whether
your data is misused or not. It can then be used for proﬁling, forwarded to other
parties, used for spamming, etc. You need some trust relation with your partners
before you release your data. With P3P [16], you can build this trust relation with
your partners. By publishing its P3P policy, a service provider exactly explains
what kind of personal data it collects, its purpose and duration of the collection,
the other receivers of the personal data, whether the user can be identiﬁed from
the collected data, etc. You check this policy automatically with Appel preference
language and decide whether or not to communicate with the provider. P3P does
not guarantee the enforcement of the policies, but it can be evaluated as a promise
of providers.
The mobile identity management systems should be equipped with P3P support
and a suitable preference language as explained in Section 5.4. Integration of P3P
avoids the pitfalls “obscuring actual and potential information ﬂow” and “lacking
coarse-grained control”. Moreover, before any data is released to service providers,
this is asked to mobile users to allow or not for the transmission. This is an extra
mechanism for avoiding the relevant pitfalls.
5.6 Status as Soft Shut-Down Button
The privacy of users are directly concerned with the status and mood of users. If a
user is busy or away, he would not want to interact with any application. Similarly,
if he is very angry or upset, he would refuse to take part in any mobile service.
Therefore, a status option is inevitable for the mobile identity management system
of context-aware applications. If a mobile user switches his status from online to
oﬄine, any data release should be automatically stopped.
The avoid of the pitfall “lacking coarse-grained control” requires a simple mech-
anism to cut oﬀ the transfer of data and with a simple status option, this can be
achieved in the mobile identity managemet system for the Friend Finder application.
5.7 History Management
History management in mobile identity management systems allow mobile users
to follow their past activies (i.e. the released context data, date, time, the corre-
sponding partner, etc.). Besides, the history management allows users to interact
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directly with the receivers of their personal data, inform about the cancellation of
their consent and make them delete their personal data from their media.
Integrating history management within the Friend Finder’s identity management
system, mobile users would be able check at any time to whom they have given away
their location information. Therefore, the pitfalls “obscuring potential and actual
information ﬂows” and “inhibiting established practice” are avoided.
5.8 Conﬁdential Data Management
With the increasing popularity of mobile devices, conﬁdentiality of mobile data has
become more serious. Many mobile devices (e.g. laptops, PDAs, mobile phones)
are either forgotten in taxis or public transport or they get stolen. If the mobile
data stored on devices are not encrypted, the conﬁdentiality of personal data is left
in danger.
Mobile identity management systems deal with personal data that are normally
very sensitive data. Therefore, the mobile identity management system should apply
encryption techniques on the ﬂy and prevent illegal access of unauthorized people to
conﬁdential information. This aspect is related to privacy patterns and thus avoids
the pitfall “inhibiting established practice”.
5.9 Content and Communication Anonymity
Content anonymity requires staying anonymous at application level. Pseudonyms
can be used for enforcing content anonymity. Communication anonymity is related
to network level anonymity. If a user communicates directly with a service provider,
he leaves many signs that can be used for revealing the real identity of the user 4 .
Communication anonymity networks and the relevant tools [15,9,19] today exist for
preventing service providers from identifying of users.
The mobile identity management systems should be equipped with such tools
and pseudonym-support and enable users to communicate anonymously both at
application and network level. Providing this, the pitfall “inhibiting established
practice” is avoided. Besides, the mobile identity management hides the complexity
of enforcing anonymity from users and therefore avoids the pitfall “emphasizing
conﬁguration over action”.
6 The Aspects in Action
In this section, we integrate the aspects explained in the previous section within the
Friend Finder application as illustrated in Figure 5. In our example, the location
provider as a trusted party exists and collects location information from mobile
users. Mr. Fischer, as a mobile user, allows his wife and his boss to query his
location and track his movements on a visual map displayed on their mobile devices.
The map provider receives the location information of mobile users from the location
provider and presents them on a visual map for the mobile users.
4 For a complete list of data revealed in case of direct communication, refer to http://gemal.dk/browserspy/
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Fig. 5. The Aspects integrated in the Friend Finder Application
We emphasize the aspects explicitly in this application scenario as follows: Be-
fore communicating with the location provider, mobile users specify which static
and dynamic data are sent to the location provider. As shown in the Figure 5, Mr.
Fischer releases his location information in city level. This is the integration of the
aspect “blurring in levels”. Additionally, he can push the button “Manage Appel
Prefs.” and specify his Appel privacy preferences for the trust management with
the location provider and map provider. He can also specify some exceptions related
to the aspect context-to-context relations like “my location information should be
sent to my boss only in the weekdays from 09.00 to 18.00” or “my location infor-
mation should be sent to my wife any day if I am in Germany”. In order to express
such relations, we need an extensible preference language. These are the integration
of the aspects context-to-context relation and extensible preference language. Mr.
Fischer can also access his history data summarizing what kind of information was
released, at what time and to whom by pressing the “History” button. This is the
aspect history management.
Afterwards, Mr. Fischer presses the “Apply” button and the communication
with the location provider starts. Initially, the P3P policy of the location provider
is retrieved and compared with his Appel preferences (i.e. the aspect trust man-
agement with P3P). If there is not any conﬂiction, he is asked to conﬁrm that
his location data will be sent periodically. At this point, the aspect “context-to-
context dependence” comes into the play. Mr. Fischer did not choose the attribute
“weather condition” to be released. But since the current location as the city name
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is released, it is also clear that the receiver can easily ﬁnd out this attribute. He
is warned against this conﬂiction. If he conﬁrms, his location is sent within a pe-
riodical time to the location provider. For the ﬁrst time, he sends also his Appel
preferences and context relation rules. The location provider takes his preferences
and the exceptions into consideration and evaluates them before his location data
is forwarded to other principals.
When the visual map provider asks for his location information, the location
provider compares his Appel preferences and the P3P policy of the visual map
provider. It also checks the exceptions for the context relations and then releases the
relevant data to the visual map provider. In addition, if Mr. Fischer communicates
directly with the map provider, the communication is built upon an anonymous
network automatically (i.e. the aspect anonymity).
7 Conclusion
Identity management is a requirement for the Internet users which share their per-
sonal data with service providers to protect their privacy. Considering context-
aware and especially location-aware applications in which users current location
data is distributed between diﬀerent parties, mobile identity management has be-
come inevitable. Today, we need privacy-enhancing tools to support mobile identity
management. Additionally, for context-aware applications, the relevant aspects for
identity management need to reevaluated and enhanced. In this paper, we focused
on a certain push context-aware application (i.e. the Friend Finder application) and
evaluated the required aspects (i.e. context-to-context relations and dependence,
extensible preference language, blurring in levels, trust management with P3P, sta-
tus as soft shut-down button, history management, conﬁdential data management
and content/communication anonymity) from the perspective of mobile identity
management in the Friend Finder application.
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